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INTRODUCTION
If a corporate creditor seeks to "pierce the corporate veil"' of
the debtor corporation to hold a particular shareholder personally
liable for the corporation's unsatisfied obligations to that creditor,
* Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
J.D., Yale University, 1985, Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1978. I would like to thank
Frank Gewurtz, David Millon, and Stephen Presser for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Jeffrey Mills for his excellent
research assistance.
1. It is not known exactly who originated this colorful phrase that is now often
used to describe having a corporation's separate existence disregarded and a par-
ticular corporate shareholder held liable to a corporate creditor for the corpora-
tion's unsatisfied obligations to that creditor. However, the phrase was first
popularized by I. Maurice Wormser in a 1912 article and in a subsequent 1927
treatise on the topic. See I. MAUICE WORMSER, DisREGARD OF THE COiPORATE Fic-
85
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what law should be applied to resolve the matter? In particular,
should the law of the state of incorporation be applied, under the
theory that the crucial relationship involved in such a controversy is
the one between the corporation and the target shareholder, an
"internal" relationship that, under the widely respected internal af-
fairs doctrine, is properly governed by that state's law?2 Or should
the courts instead regard the crucial relationship involved as being
the one between the creditor and the corporation, and conse-
quently utilize general choice-of-law principles, which call for bal-
ancing the interests of all jurisdictions that have relevant contacts
with the matter or with the creditor or corporation, to determine
which state's law to apply?3
TION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 30 (1927); I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the
Veil of a Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REv. 496, 496 (1912).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
3. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)] articulates the general choice-of-law framework for both tort
and contract claims and treats these different types of claims somewhat differently.
The most important of these provisions are set forth below. The general choice-of-
law framework for determining the law applicable to tort claims is contained in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 145:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the in-
jury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, be-
tween the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 6, which is referred to above by section 145(1),
states the following:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determi-
nation of the particular issue, (d) the protection ofjustified expectations, (e)
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predict-
ability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and applica-
tion of the law to be applied.
For contract claims, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) states at section 186 that "[i]ssues
in contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with the
rule of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in accordance with the rule of
§ 188." Id. § 186. Section 187 then states the following:
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Under the general choice-of-law 'approach, incorporation in a
jurisdiction is a relevant contact with that jurisdiction, but it is not
the only factor to be considered. 4 Courts following this approach
will, in some instances, after conducting the requisite balancing of
interests, apply the law of the state of incorporation to the contro-
versy. In other instances, however, they may choose to apply a dif-
ferent jurisdiction's rules. Courts following the internal affairs
approach, however, will always apply the law of the state of incorpo-
ration.5 In cases where the law of corporate disregard differs sub-
stantially among the jurisdictions that have significant contacts with
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties
could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the
parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either (a) the chosen state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state
would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the
local law of the state of the chosen law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 188 then states the following principles regarding
the choice of law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the agreement of
the parties:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place of contracting, (b)
the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the
location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporatiod and place of business of the parties. These
contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with re-
spect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are
in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as
otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) sections 189-199 and 203 then deal with certain specific
types of contracts for which special choice of law rules apply, and with certain
issues relating to capacity to contract, writing requirements, and usury limitations.
4. See id. §§ 145, 188.
5. See infra Part I.
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the transaction at issue or the parties involved, the choice-of-law ap-
proach followed may be outcome-determinative.
For example, one important difference among the states in the
piercing jurisprudence is whether the issue of whether there are
adequate grounds for corporate disregard is regarded as a legal
matter for the judge to resolve or instead a factual question to be
left to the jury. Courts in different jurisdictions disagree on this
issue.6 Whether a plaintiff has the right to a jury determination on
this question can be highly significant and, of course, can also im-
pact the settlement incentives of the parties. This difference be-
tween jurisdictions may be limited to piercing controversies, or may
in some instances reflect broader jurisdictional differences in the
allocation of roles between judges and juries.
Another significant distinction among the states is that the
Texas piercing law is an amalgamation of a very pro-piercing court
decision7 and a statute adopted subsequent to, and in response to,
"grave concern within the Texas business community" about that
decision" that imposed significant restrictions on piercing, and
which has to some extent legislatively overruled that precedent.9
The piercing law in all other state jurisdictions, in contrast, has an
exclusively common law basis. Texas is also, to my knowledge, the
only state that has legislatively imposed the law of the state of incor-
poration to govern piercing claims against out-of-state corpora-
tions. 10 There are a variety of other differences among the states as
to their piercing jurisprudence.I' It may be the case that not all
6. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853, 905 (1997).
7. Casdeberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. 1986) (holding that for
piercing on the basis of fraud, a showing of constructive fraud is sufficient).
8. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 283-84
(10th ed. 2007).
9. See TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003) (imposing stringent
limitations on the ability of a plaintiff to argue for veil piercing on the basis of
'constructive fraud" or on the basis of the corporation's failure to follow corporate
formalities).
10. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02A (Vernon 2003) ("A foreign corpo-
ration ... shall ... enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a
domestic corporation ... and shall be subject to the same duties, restrictions, pen-
alties, and liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon a domestic corporation of like
character .... ").
11. For discussion of other significant differences among the states as to their
piercing jurisprudence, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcO-
NOMICS 164 (2002) ("Delaware's veil piercing doctrine is comparatively underde-
veloped."); ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTrIES
282-83 (2006) ("Delaware courts are extremely reluctant to pierce .... Many
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jurisdictions can be easily slotted along a single-dimension contin-
uum with regard to the relative permissiveness of their piercing ju-
risprudence. Some jurisdictions may be more open to allowing
piercing claims on some theories or under some factual circum-
stances than are some other jurisdictions, yet they also may be rela-
tively more restrictive with regard to other theories or other factual
circumstances, making an overall assessment of the relative availa-
bility of piercing remedies across jurisdictions more complex.12
states have . . . lists [of factors justifying piercing] in their case law and the lists
keep growing. Doubtless lists are passed from law clerk to law clerk at state su-
preme courts around the country. If you thought South Dakota's list of 6 [factors]
was impressive, you should be aware that Kansas has 10 factors, Oklahoma has 11,
Maine and Massachusetts have 12, and California and West Virginia have 19. A
Hawaii case [Robert's Hawaii School Bus, Inc. v. Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., 982 P.2d
853, 871 (Haw. 1999)] listed the California factors and added others not on the
California list."); HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 8, at 288 ("The Delaware law of
piercing is pro-defendant"); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORA-
TIONS 416 (5th ed. 2006) ("Some states are more liberal than others in permitting
piercing."); LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS OR-
GANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 425 (5th ed. 2001) ("In [Robert]
Thompson's [1991] study certain states such as California were more inclined, and
other states such as Pennsylvania and New York were less inclined, to pierce the
corporate veil.") (citation omitted); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil:
An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1052-53 (1991) ("[There is] a per-
ception that public policy in California... favor[s] piercing the corporate veil....
As a group, the New York decisions seem somewhat more restrictive on piercing
than cases from the rest of the country.... [There may also be] a general leaning
toward protecting corporations [from piercing] in [Delaware].").
For a current and comprehensive state-by-state summary of piercing law, see
generally Chapter 2 in STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (2007).
Presser generally acknowledges the existence of significant variations in piercing
law across the different jurisdictions, and in his treatise he discusses the specific
features of each state's piercing jurisprudence and leading cases in some detail.
Id. Those discussions suggest that there are a number of differences among the
piercing case law of various jurisdictions, albeit often only subtle differences of
wording that are perhaps not significant enough to overcome judicial attitudinal
predispositions. See id. Those differences are surely of less practical significance
than the distinctions discussed above with regard to the California, Delaware, New
York, and Texas piercing jurisprudence, both because of their lesser jurispruden-
tial impact and because of the generally smaller number of corporations chartered
in those otherjurisdictions. However, they may still be consequential in an appro-
priate case. Presser does not, however, attempt to offer a "ranking" of the states
along a single continuum as to the relative permissiveness of their overall piercing
jurisprudence, nor does he address the choice-of-law issue here considered.
12. For example, some jurisdictions may embrace the principle expressed by
the California Supreme Court in Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1961),
in which it ruled that inadequate capitalization alone may be a basis for allowing a
piercing claim, while otherwise embracing a relatively restrictive piercing jurispru-
dence. On the other hand, some states may instead follow the approach of the
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The choice-of-law jurisprudence regarding corporate veil pierc-
ing is conflicting and poorly articulated. The majority of courts ap-
ply the internal affairs doctrine to impose the law of the state of
incorporation upon piercing claims, whether those claims are
based on tort judgments or upon contract obligations.' 3 However,
a number of courts have opted to conduct a more general choice-
of-law analysis that focuses instead upon the creditor-corporation
relationship and balances the interests of the different jurisdictions
that may be involved, which sometimes leads to the courts applying
local piercing law-or the law of yet another jurisdiction that is not
the state of incorporation-to a piercing controversy involving an
out-of-state corporation.14 The major corporation law casebooks
court in Waliovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. 1966), which is much more
restrictive with regard to the significance of undercapitalization, but otherwise em-
braces a relatively permissive piercing jurisprudence.
13. See, e.g., 9 ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING
§ 120.07 (2007) ("The nature and extent of a shareholder's liability [for corporate
obligations] is usually governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the corpora-
tion is created."); CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 11, at 282 ("[M]ost courts that have
addressed the issue have decided that piercing should be subject to the internal
affairs doctrine."); HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 11, at 417 ("The rule generally
followed in the few cases that have addressed the issue is that the liability of a
stockholder for the debts of the corporation is a matter of the internal affairs of a
corporation, to be governed by the law of the state of incorporation."); see also
Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cendant Corp., No. 3:03-CV-00029-TMB, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55474, at *28-29 (D. AlaskaJuly 27, 2007); United States v. ERGS, Inc., No.
03:02-CV-0615-LRH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2007);
Direct Energy Mktg., Ltd. v. Duke/Louis Dreyfus LLC, No. 3:99CV1942, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14356, at *8-10 (D. Conn. June 13, 2001) (applying the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation, but only after conducting a general choice-of-law
analysis, and citing section 307 in dicta); Autrey v. 22 Texas Servs., Inc., 79 F. Supp.
2d 735, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Maltz v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 992 F.
Supp. 286, 300 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Inst. Servs., 832
N.E.2d 666, 674 n.15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). See generally the cases cited for this
proposition in 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 43.72 n.2 (rev. vol. 2006), and in 9 CAVITCH, supra, at § 120.07
n.1.
14. See, e.g., Schwan v. CNH Am. LLC, No. 4:04-CV-3384, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28516, at *58-60 (D. Neb. May 4, 2006) (applying the local Nebraska law
rather than the Delaware law of the state of incorporation to a piercing contro-
versy); Direct Energy Mktg., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14356, at *8-10 (applying the law
of the jurisdiction of incorporation, but only after conducting a general choice-of-
law analysis, and citing section 307 in dicta); Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corp., No.
CIV.A.95-5284, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14563, *33-37 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1997) (cit-
ing Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 1313,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y.July 13, 1988) in support of apply-
ing general choice-of-law principles in piercing controversies involving the rights
of parties external to the corporation); Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F.
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and treatises, while unfortunately giving this choice-of-law question
only rather cursory treatment, generally recognize this split of au-
thority.' 5 I will argue in this Article that determining the body of
law to apply to piercing controversies through the application of
general choice-of-law principles is a superior approach for accom-
modating the interests involved, as compared to treating such con-
troversies as internal affairs governed by the law of the state of
incorporation. My argument applies both to piercing claims based
on tort judgments and to those based upon contractual
obligations. 16
Supp. 1097, 1102-03 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (applying "most significant relationship"
test to determine that local law applies); Bankard v. First Carolina Commc'ns, Inc.,
No. 89-C-8571, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17916, at *35-39 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1991)
(citing section 307 and ultimately applying the law of the state of incorporation to
a piercing claim, but only after conducting a general choice-of-law analysis); Itel
Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 1313, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y.July 13, 1988); Kempe v. Ocean Drilling
& Exploration Co., 683 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-73 (E.D. La. 1988); In re World Vision
Entm't, Inc., 275 B.R. 641, 661-62 (Bankr. M.D. Fl. 2002) (applying the law of the
state of incorporation, but only after conducting a general choice-of-law analysis);
see alsoJoncas v. Krueger, 213 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Wis. 1973) (holding that shareholders
of foreign corporations are statutorily liable for claims made against the corpora-
tion by its employees).
15. See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 43.72 ("Veil piercing cases implicate
corporate law but involve disputes that reach beyond the confines of the corpora-
don. Thus, some courts have decided that the internal affairs doctrine applies in
veil piercing cases and that the law of the state of incorporation should govern,
while other courts have disagreed."); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 164-65;
HAMiLTON & MACEY, supra note 8, at 287-88; SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 11, at
425; Proceedings, Fourth Annual International Business Law Symposium: Multinational
Corporations and Cross Border Conflicts: Nationality, Veil Piercing, and Successor Liability,
10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 221, 270 (1995) (comments of Phillip Blumberg) ("[M]ost
courts treat... piercing the veil as involving the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion .... Many other courts, however, have not looked upon the problem [of
piercing] as a corporate problem.... they treat the choice of law as involving a
problem in tort. Where the tort occurred in the forum, these courts often apply
the forum's standards on piercing the veil.").
16. I will not address in this Article the question of when federal common law,
rather than state law, provides the appropriate legal framework for resolving a
piercing controversy. This issue can arise when the underlying claim against a
corporation is based upon federal law, such as, for example, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2000), better known as the "Superfund" law. For a discussion of this question, see
Jennifer S. Martin, Consistency in Judicial Interpretation? A Look at CERCLA Parent
Company and Shareholder Liability after United States v. Bestfoods, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 409, 427-29, 450-58 (2000); Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego
Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 853, 859-64 (1982).
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Courts that have applied the internal affairs doctrine have
badly misjudged the relative merits of these two different choice-of-
law approaches. Interestingly, this error has not generally occurred
as a result of these courts conducting a full assessment of the matter
but for one reason or another according improper weight to the
various considerations involved. The error has instead derived pri-
marily from an easily identified source: a widespread and funda-
mental misunderstanding of the meaning of section 307 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws. 17 This provision, though not
embodied in statutory enactments, has nevertheless been very influ-
ential and has been misunderstood by many courts to have defini-
tively resolved the choice-of-law question in favor of the internal
affairs doctrine.18 Because these courts have consistently regarded
the provision as authoritative, they have further found it unneces-
sary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the underlying policies and
interests implicated by the choice-of-law question, which might re-
veal this prior error. Other courts have then uncritically relied
upon these judicial precedents in which courts have misunderstood
section 307.19
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 307 is titled "Shareholders' Liability" and
succinctly states the following: "The local law of the state of incorporation will be
applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the
corporation for assessments or contribution and to its creditors for corporate debts."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 307 (emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Alaska Rent-A-Car, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55474, at *28-29; ERGS,
Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at *6; Amoco Chem. Co. v. Tex Tin Corp., 925 F.
Supp. 1192, 1201 (S.D. Tex. 1996); In re Blanton, 105 B.R. 811, 821 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1989).
19. See, e.g., Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130, 132-33 (2d Cir.
1993); Autrey v. 22 Tex. Servs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2000);
Maltz v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 992 F. Supp. 286, 300 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Heyman v. Beatrice Co., No. 89-C-7381, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4135, at *19-20 (N.D. I1. Apr. 3, 1995); Realmark Inv. Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp. 171
B.R. 692, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1994); In re R.C.S. Engineered Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 598,
602 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994); Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Inst. Servs., 832 N.E.2d
666, 674 n.15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
But some courts do not understand RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) section 307 as
necessarily calling for application of the law of the state of incorporation. See, e.g.,
Schwan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28516, at *58-60; Direct Energy Mktg., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14356, at *8-10 (applying the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation, but
only after conducting a general choice-of-law analysis, and citing section 307 in
dicta); Curiale, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14563, at *33-37 (citing Itel Containers in
support of applying general choice-of-law principles in piercing controversies in-
volving the rights of parties external to the corporation); Chrysler, 972 F. Supp. at
1102-03 (applying local law); Bankard, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17916, at *35-39
(citing section 307 and ultimately applying the law of the state of incorporation to
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In other words, the courts that have followed the internal af-
fairs doctrine have generally not done so as a consequence of con-
sidering and rejecting the arguments in favor of the general choice-
of-law approach that I will set forth below in Part U1 of this Article.
Rather, they have done so simply because they have either read sec-
tion 307 literally, and simplistically, as definitively endorsing the in-
ternal affairs doctrine approach without considering other relevant
provisions of the Restatement (Second) or the underlying objectives
sought by its drafters, or because they have uncritically followed ear-
lier precedents so misinterpreting section 307 without giving any
real thought to the dubious rationale underlying those precedents.
This judicial error has significant practical consequences for
the conduct of piercing litigation. While corporate disregard is a
doctrine that is available only to the creditors of closely-held corpo-
rations (and not to the creditors of public corporations),20 some
corporations are quite large and conduct business in numerous ju-
risdictions. 21 Many piercing claims asserted against the sharehold-
ers of the larger closely-held corporations would likely be resolved
under the law of a jurisdiction that is not the state of incorporation,
were a general choice-of-law analysis conducted by the reviewing
court. In addition, in recent years the jurisprudence regarding cor-
porate disregard has diverged more widely among state jurisdic-
a piercing claim, but only after conducting a general choice-of-law analysis); Itel
Containers, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051, at *12-15; Kempe, 683 F. Supp. at 1072-73
(implicitly rejecting that reading of section 307); In re World Vision Entm't, Inc., 275
B.R. at 661-62 (applying the law of the state of incorporation, but only after con-
ducting a general choice-of-law analysis); see alsoJoncas, 213 N.W.2d at 3-5 (implic-
itly rejecting the broad and deferential reading of section 307 when construing a
local statute).
20. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 8, at 266 ("Statistically speaking, pierc-
ing the corporate veil is entirely a phenomenon of closely held corporations, and
predominantly one-person corporations. The corporate form is simply never
pierced so as to impose liability against shareholders in a publicly traded corpora-
tion."); see also Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liabil-
ity Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1997).
21. Consider, for example, the examples of the Cargill Corporation and the
Mars Corporation, both of which are closely-held corporations that are neverthe-
less quite large and well-known to the public, and which each have very extensive
interstate and multi-national operations. See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin & David
Barboza, Private Agriculture Giant to Go a Bit Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at Cl
(discussing Cargill); Pamela Sherrid, The Mars Family Faces a Bittersweet Moment, U.S.
NEws & WoRLD REP., Aug. 9, 1999, at 42 (discussing Mars).
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tions,2 2 therefore making the choice of law applied to resolve a
piercing controversy increasingly outcome-determinative. 23
In particular, the piercing laws of Delaware, New York, and
Pennsylvania are regarded by commentators as unusually favorable
to the corporate shareholders resisting such a claim.24 Consider
the situation facing a corporate creditor seeking to have a Dela-
ware- or New York-chartered corporation disregarded to impose lia-
bility upon a shareholder in a matter that has some significant
contacts with another state that has a more permissive piercing ju-
risprudence. 25 That creditor would likely first attempt to persuade
the court to apply the more general choice-of-law framework,
rather than the internal affairs doctrine approach, so as to give him-
self a chance to have that more permissive body of law applied. The
target shareholder, in contrast, would likely argue for application of
the internal affairs doctrine approach so as to avail himself of the
more restrictive piercing jurisprudence of the state of incorpora-
tion. The piercing jurisprudence of California, in contrast, is re-
22. See supra note 11.
23. One might argue that, even with the growing divergence among state ju-
risdictions as to the contours of their piercing jurisprudence, there is inherently
enough flexibility in the multi-factor balancing analyses to allow courts to reach
whatever results they deem equitable, regardless of the permissive or restrictive
language of the applicable precedents in their jurisdiction. In this regard it would
be useful to study (1) the extent to which the courts in a given jurisdiction reach
consistent results in piercing cases presenting similar fact patterns, and (2) the
extent to which courts in differentjurisdictions that vary in their piercing jurispru-
dence reach different results in cases with similar fact patterns. If such a study
revealed a pervasive pattern of inconsistency within jurisdictions, or consistency of
result across jurisdictions with different formal piercing rules, it would suggest that
courts would be less likely to resist my recommendation that they engage in a gen-
eral choice-of-law analysis to choose the applicable law rather than follow the inter-
nal affairs doctrine approach, since the choice-of-law approach followed would not
significantly constrain their decisions. If this were, in fact, the case, then I would
be forced to concede, and this would also suggest, that the question of the appro-
priate choice-of-law approach is ultimately of less significance than I claim it to be
in this Article.
24. See, e.g., CHIPPINELLI, supra note 11, at 282-84 (discussing Delaware
piercing law); Thompson, supra note 11, at 1050, 1052-53; see also Southeast Tex.
Inns, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 462 F.3d 666, 683 (6th Cir. 2006) (Delaware
law requires proof of 'fraud or similar injustice' to pierce a corporate veil .... The
Tennessee standard appears to be less stringent.") (Oberdorfer, J., dubitante). For
a current state-by-state summary and comparison of piercing law, see generally the
comprehensive treatise by PRESSER, supra note 11.
25. The state of California is one such example. See SODERQuiST ET AL., supra
note 11, at 425; Thompson, supra note 11, at 1052. For a current state-by-state
summary and comparison of piercing law, see generally the comprehensive treatise
by PRESSER, supra note 11.
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garded as unusually favorable to piercing attempts, 26 so the
contending parties would probably offer the opposite choice-of-law
arguments when a piercing claim is being asserted against a Califor-
nia corporation in a matter that has significant contacts with an-
other jurisdiction that has a more restrictive piercing
jurisprudence. Finally, Texas law is a complicated mix of statutory
and common law elements that is unusually favorable to veil pierc-
ing in some regards2 7 and unusually unfavorable in other regards,28
so the decision by the parties whether to advocate for the internal
affairs approach or the more general choice-of-law approach (in in-
stances where the choice of law is not statutorily determined) 29 is a
more complicated strategic decision.
Sparring over choice-of-law issues before the merits of a pierc-
ing claim can be addressed is obviously costly. Moreover, from a
broader social perspective, it is undesirable-even apart from its ex-
tra costs-since, as I will show, the general choice-of-law approach
is superior. Procedural wrangling and its associated costs and de-
lays could be eliminated if the courts came to generally recognize
the superiority of the general choice-of-law approach. The applica-
tion of the internal affairs doctrine to the choice of law applicable
to piercing controversies should be discarded forthwith in favor of
using more general choice-of-law principles focusing upon the
creditor-corporation relationship. The latter approach would bet-
ter accommodate all of the interests and policies involved, 0 as is
discussed in Part II of this Article.
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will very briefly
discuss the general features of the internal affairs doctrine. In Part
II, I will explain in some detail why the general choice-of-law ap-
proach, rather than the internal affairs doctrine approach, should
26. See SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 11, at 425; Thompson, supra note 11, at
1052; see also CHAPPINELLI, supra note 11, at 283-84 (discussing a list of nineteen
factors considered by California courts in determining whether to pierce). For a
current state-by-state summary and comparison of piercing law, see generally the
comprehensive treatise by PRESSER, supra note 11.
27. Under the controlling Castleberry precedent, the question under Texas law
of whether the corporate veil should be pierced is regarded as a factual matter for
jury determination, see supra note 8, which is not the case in most other jurisdic-
tions. See generally PRESSER, supra note 11.
28. See TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003) (imposing stringent limi-
tations on the ability of a plaintiff to argue for veil piercing on the basis of "con-
structive fraud" or on the basis of the corporation's failure to follow corporate
formalities).
29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory limita-
tions imposed by Texas Business Corporations Act article 8.02A).
30. But see supra note 23.
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be used to determine the applicable law for resolving piercing con-
troversies whether they are based on tort judgments or instead
upon contract obligations. Having made clear the relative advan-
tages of the general choice-of-law approach, in Part III I will discuss
the modestly sized-and somewhat disappointing-body ofjudicial
opinions interpreting Restatement (Second) section 307. I will explain
how and why section 307 has been misunderstood by some courts as
calling for the application of the internal affairs doctrine to pierc-
ing controversies, and how those misunderstandings have unfortu-
nately generated a body of precedent with an inertial force of its
own. Part IV will present a brief conclusion and my recommenda-
tions and will offer some preliminary observations regarding the ap-
plicability of my analysis for piercing claims asserted in the context
of non-corporate entities such as limited liability companies, lim-
ited liability partnerships, and limited liability limited partnerships.
I.
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
The internal affairs doctrine is a widely embraced common law
rule that provides that disputes regarding the internal affairs of a
corporation be resolved in accordance with the law of the state of
incorporation.3 1 This rule applies regardless of any contacts that
either the transaction at issue or the parties involved in the dispute
may have with other jurisdictions, and regardless of how little con-
tact the transaction or the parties may otherwise have with the state
of incorporation, unless the parties have chosen to apply another
body of law.3 2 The doctrine is generally justified as a means of
achieving predictability of result and protecting the justified expec-
tations of parties with interests in the corporation, while avoiding
subjecting the corporation to inconsistent rules regarding its inter-
nal governance procedures.33
For the purposes of this Article, I will assume that the internal
affairs doctrine is the correct choice-of-law approach for the courts
31. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 8, at 197.
32. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine,
32 J. Corn,. L. 33, 39-40 (2006).
33. See id. at 40 ("Unlike more complex conflicts analyses used in other areas
of law, the internal affairs doctrine offers a consistent choice of law for firms and
their investors, for whom certainty is said to be critical."); see also Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability, 106 HARv.
L. REv. 446, 453 (1992) (quoting First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio,
462 U.S. 611, 621-22 (1983)); Note, The Internal Affairs Doarine: TheoreticalJustifica-
tions and Tentative Explanations for its Continued Primacy, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1480,
1485-87 (2002).
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to use when parties are litigating the contours of an internal corpo-
rate relationship, though not all commentators would accept this
contention.3 4 The greatest uncertainty in the application of the in-
ternal affairs doctrine is in determining which contractual or other
relationships that persons may have with a corporation constitute
such internal relationships and which ones are instead external re-
lationships to which different choice-of-law principles apply, 5 given
that all corporate relationships are in a sense external relationships
of the corporation with separate juridical persons. Despite the
somewhat hazy outer contours of the doctrine,3 6 all commentators
agree that the relationship between a corporation and its common
shareholders is properly regarded as an internal relationship. Simi-
larly, it is undisputed that in the ordinary course of business, the
contract creditors and tort judgment creditors of a corporation
each have an "external" relationship with the corporation, and the
applicable law governing their claims against the corporation
should, therefore, be determined by their contractual choice-of-law
provisions, if any, or, in the absence of such provisions, by general
choice-of-law principles.3 7 The relevant question for the purposes
of this Article is whether the "external" relationship between a con-
tract creditor or tortjudgment creditor and the corporation, or in-
stead the "internal" relationship between the corporation and its
common shareholders, should be regarded as the crucial relation-
ship for choice-of-law purposes when a creditor is attempting to
have the corporate entity disregarded to hold a particular share-
holder personally liable. In the next Part, I will address that
question.
34. The internal affairs doctrine, though widely embraced by courts, has
come under substantial criticism. One common criticism is that the doctrine lacks
a constitutional basis and is supported by, at most, only prudential considerations.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 33, at 1482. A recent article by Frederick Tung provides
a comprehensive historical account of the development of the internal affairs doc-
trine in American law. See Tung, supra note 32, at 44-46.
35. Different conflicts principles apply, however, where the rights of third
parties external to the corporation are at issue. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 33, at 453; see also Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd.,
No. 86 Civ. 1313, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y.July 13, 1988).
36. See Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause: The
"Foreign" Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 376-382 (arguing that the
internal affairs doctrine is a vacuous formulation that leaves courts the discretion
to classify almost any corporate relationship as either internal or external).
37. See supra note 3 (presenting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) general frame-
work for determining the choice of law for tortjudgment creditor or contract cred-
itor piercing claims).
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II.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLYING THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE TO CHOOSE THE
APPLICABLE LAW FOR PIERCING CONTROVERSIES
Corporate creditors with contract claims differ significantly
from tort judgment creditors in that they have had the opportunity
to contractually specify what body of law will govern any later dis-
putes, including any later piercing controversies. 38 This difference
is significant for choice-of-law purposes. I will therefore analyze the
choice-of-law question for piercing controversies based upon under-
lying tort judgments separately from those based upon corporate
contractual obligations.
A. Tort Judgment-Based Piercing Claims
At first consideration, it would appear that simple fairness con-
cerns would mandate that a tort judgment-based piercing claim
should be decided under the body of law that is applicable for de-
termining the rights of the external tort creditor against the corpo-
ration, rather than under the law of the state of incorporation that
would be imposed under the internal affairs doctrine. Otherwise,
the controlling shareholders of a corporation that are potentially
subject to liability from successful piercing claims would have the
incentive to incorporate in a jurisdiction with a relatively restrictive
piercing jurisprudence. Further, once incorporated in such ajuris-
diction, they could lend their support to efforts to have their juris-
diction impose-legislatively and/or judicially--an even more
restrictive piercing law so as to more fully externalize the impacts of
any inequitable corporate conduct, conduct for which they might
be held liable under more permissive piercing rules. Legislators or
judges who sought to make the jurisdiction more attractive for in-
corporation or reincorporation would, therefore, be inclined to
support those efforts, since the jurisdiction would receive all of the
benefits of any increased incorporation activity while much of the
costs imposed on corporate tort creditors would affect citizens of
other jurisdictions. 39 This is particularly the case in a jurisdiction
such as Delaware, which has chartered many corporations that con-
duct virtually all of their business outside of the state.
38. This is true in theory, although as a practical matter transaction costs may
prevent the parties from negotiating a comprehensive choice-of-law provision that
would specifically address piercing claims.
39. Although not all of those costs would be externalized, since some of the
tort judgment creditors disadvantaged by a restrictive piercing jurisprudence
would be citizens of the corporation's state of incorporation.
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The academic commentators who have considered the matter
have generally concluded that these fairness arguments outweigh
any concerns posed by the potential loss of predictability and uni-
formity if the applicable law must be determined in each instance
by a more general choice-of-law balancing analysis. ° However, as-
sessment of the relative merits of the different choice-of-law ap-
proaches for tort-based piercing claims is somewhat more
complicated than it may first appear.
First, from an economic efficiency point of view, the relevant
question is which of the two possible choice-of-law approaches will
be more likely to lead to the application of the most efficient pierc-
ing jurisprudence. In other words, the question is which body of
jurisprudence gives corporate shareholders the appropriate ex ante
incentives to take all cost-effective measures to avoid inequitable
corporate conduct with regard to corporate tort creditors, but not
sufficient incentive to take further prophylactic measures to limit
the possibility of the corporation's engaging in such inequitable
40. The eminent corporate law scholars Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraak-
man, for example, have clearly and succinctly rejected the internal affairs doctrine
choice-of-law approach for tort judgment-based piercing claims as inviting "gross
opportunism" on the part of shareholders to externalize costs:
[A]Ilowing a state like Delaware to determine the scope of tort liability for
companies incorporated under its law invites gross opportunism on the part
of both the state and the shareholders who invest in its corporations.
If, for example, Delaware amended its corporation law to limit corporate
liability for tort judgments to the par value of the shareholder's stock (which
most corporations set at zero), we assume that nobody would seriously argue
that the internal affairs doctrine requires that the new rule be respected. And
if Delaware adopted a restrictive veil-piercing rule that (together with the
state's liberal policy toward the creation of subsidiary corporations) effectively
permitted the same result, it is not obvious that, under a reasonable conflict of
laws doctrine, such a rule deserves anymore respect than would the par value
rule.
"To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in deter-
mining whether the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be
respected would permit the state to violate with impunity the rights of third
parties .... "
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 451, 453 (quoting First Nat'l City Bank
v. Banco Para El Comercio, 462 U.S. 611, 621-22 (1983)). Another noted scholar,
Franklin Gevurtz, has also concluded that the internal affairs doctrine should not
apply to tort judgment-based veil piercing claims, since tort creditors have no way
to avoid these inequitable consequences. Gevurtz, supra note 6, at 904 ("Contract
creditors might adjust ... to compensate for risks of dealing with corporations
from different states with varying willingness to pierce.... [T]ort victims cannot
make such adjustments. This strongly suggests that the internal affairs rule is inap-
propriate for piercing.").
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conduct when those measures are not cost-effective in terms of the
magnitude of the harms prevented. 41 A piercing jurisprudence
that is too permissive would encourage shareholders to take exces-
sively expensive precautionary measures to ensure that their corpo-
rations do not act in such a way as to expose them to personal
liability for unsatisfied corporation tort judgments, or else to bear
the costs of reincorporating elsewhere if that were a more effective
means of avoiding the consequences of that overly permissive pierc-
ing jurisprudence. Similarly, an overly restrictive piercing jurispru-
dence would undercut the incentives of the shareholders of local
corporations to take cost-justified prophylactic measures and would
encourage out-of-state corporations to reincorporate in the jurisdic-
tion to lessen shareholder exposure to such piercing claims.
Whether the use of the internal affairs doctrine approach is
inefficient in this regard is a complicated and difficult question.
Use of this approach to select the applicable body of law does give
corporate shareholders the unseemly incentive to incorporate (or
reincorporate) in jurisdictions with a relatively restrictive piercing
jurisprudence. 42 But it may be the case, under some circumstances,
that those jurisdictions' more restrictive piercing jurisprudence will
actually provide more efficient incentives for shareholders than
would the overly permissive piercing jurisprudence imposed under
the more general choice-of-law approach. The existence of incen-
tives for corporations and their shareholders to behave opportunis-
tically does not necessarily mean that the resulting changes in their
behavior would lead away from, rather than toward, efficiency. A
more complex analysis that compares the piercing law of each juris-
diction to a hypothetical standard of efficient piercing rules43
would be necessary to determine whether the opportunistic incen-
tives provided by the internal affairs doctrine choice-of-law ap-
proach are efficient or inefficient.
Another complicating factor that must be considered when as-
sessing the relative efficiency of the two different choice-of-law ap-
proaches is that differences among jurisdictions as to their piercing
41. The determination of the efficient piercing rules, to which the piercing
jurisprudences of the different jurisdictions should be compared to gauge their
relative efficiency, would depend upon an assessment of the social costs and bene-
fits of allowing various kinds of piercing claims to succeed. For a discussion of the
efficiency of the principle of limited liability and various departures from this prin-
ciple allowing piercing claims to succeed, see generally David Millon, Piercing the
Corporate Vei4 Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY LJ.
1305 (2007).
42. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 451.
43. See id.
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jurisprudence is only one of many factors influencing incorpora-
tion or reincorporation decisions. Moreover, it is a factor that one
would suspect would play only a relatively minor role in the locus of
incorporation decision, as compared to more significant considera-
tions, such as administrative cost and convenience, general govern-
ance rules, or state taxes or franchise fees. In some instances,
differences among jurisdictions as to the relative permissiveness of
their piercing jurisprudence may be substantial enough to influ-
ence incorporation or reincorporation decisions, if the internal af-
fairs doctrine approach is followed. But in most cases one would
expect those jurisprudential differences to not be significant
enough or predictable enough to influence these particular deci-
sions. They might well affect, at most, only the extensiveness of
measures taken to avoid shareholder-piercing liability. The extent
to which adjustments in corporate behavior would result for a par-
ticular corporation from judicial application of the internal affairs
doctrine approach rather than a general choice-of-law approach
would appear to depend upon which specific jurisdictions are being
compared and the many other circumstances facing that particular
corporation. The empirical research relating to the importance of
the differences in the piercing jurisprudence across jurisdictions
relative to other factors is quite sparse,4 4 and more research along
these lines would be helpful in establishing the relative sensitivity of
incorporation or reincorporation decisions to these various factors.
It would be impossible at this point to offer any sweeping gen-
eralizations as to the relative economic efficiency of the two possi-
ble choice-of-law approaches for resolving tort judgment-based
piercing controversies. To do so, it would be necessary to first con-
duct a fact-specific study to determine to what extent incorporation
or reincorporation decisions would be altered by a change in the
44. There is, however, one recent and interesting study that attempts to iso-
late and quantify the various factors that influence incorporation decisions for pri-
vately held corporations, and which includes variations in piercing jurisprudence
as one of the explanatory factors in the regression model there utilized. SeeJens
Dammann & Martha Schandeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held Corpora-
tions (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 119, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1049581. That study, while noting that the
vague standards of piercing law make it difficult to evaluate differences in piercing
risk, did conclude that there was statistically significant support for the conclusion
that "the higher the percentage of cases in which the veil was pierced, the lower
the likelihood that a corporation from that state incorporates locally." Id. at 15,
23. Further, the study concluded that the statistical support for this conclusion was
strongest for firms in the range of 100-5000 employees, but weaker for firms of
sizes outside this range, and that these results were robust with regard to different
regional and industry aggregations. Id. at 23, 27.
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
choice-of-law approach applied in tort judgment-based piercing
controversies, and what changes, if any, those corporations would
make in their internal control procedures to lessen shareholder
piercing exposure.
For those corporations whose incorporation or reincorpora-
tion decisions would be influenced by a change in the choice-of-law
approach, it would then be necessary to determine when such a
change in approach would result in a change in the body of law
applicable to those corporations' particular tort claim-based pierc-
ing controversies. Under some (and perhaps most) circumstances,
a move to a general choice-of-law balancing analysis would still re-
sult in the application of the law of the state of incorporation. 45 For
those instances in which the different choice-of-law approaches
would, in fact, lead to the application of a different body of law, it
would be necessary to compare the piercing law of the two relevant
jurisdictions to determine what effects, if any, this change of law
would have for the resolution of those controversies. 46 Whether or
not a change in the choice-of-law approach would result in a
change in where a particular corporation incorporates, it would still
be necessary to see whether the change in approach would result in
a different level of corporate effort to preclude tortjudgment-based
piercing claims from succeeding or even arising, and then deter-
mine whether that changed conduct were a move toward or away
from efficient levels of precaution. To answer all of these ques-
tions, a comprehensive and complex study of the comparative effi-
ciency effects of these different choice-of-law approaches would
have to be undertaken. Such a study, to my knowledge, has not yet
been attempted.
Yet another necessary dimension of a comparative efficiency
assessment would be a comparison of the extent to which either of
the two different choice-of-law approaches provides greater social
benefits due to greater predictability and/or uniformity as to the
applicable law, since, other things being equal, greater predictabil-
ity and uniformity of law both facilitate planning, and thus contrib-
ute to efficient resource use. The application of the internal affairs
doctrine would make the determination of the applicable body of
45. This would likely often be the case, since piercing is a doctrine that is
applicable only to closely held corporations, and many (though not all) closely-
held corporations are small corporations that engage in only local activities; so a
general choice-of-law balancing analysis done in connection with a tort judgment-
based piercing claim would often also lead to the choice of the law of the state of
incorporation.
46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also supra note 45.
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law more predictable and uniform, as it would eliminate the need
for undertaking an unpredictable balancing analysis. However,
scholars regard these benefits of greater predictability and uniform-
ity provided by the internal affairs approach in the piercing context
to be quite small.
47
One reason for this is that many (though not all) 48 states have
roughly similar piercing jurisprudence. Another reason is that
often the more general choice-of-law approach will also lead to ap-
plication of the law of the state of incorporation, therefore main-
taining uniformity.49 A third reason is that the use of a more
general choice-of-law approach is unlikely to create a problem of
subjecting a corporation to inconsistent internal governance de-
mands, as opposed to merely establishing the most permissive juris-
diction's jurisprudence as the minimum threshold that corporate
and/or shareholder conduct must meet to avoid potential share-
holder liability for unsatisfied corporation tort judgments in all
jurisdictions.5 0
47. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1054 ("[Departure from the internal af-
fairs doctrine approach to choice of law in veil piercing controversies] can create
uncertainty if multiple states seek to apply differing rules of limited liability to the
same corporation. However, given the small number of piercing cases decided in
many jurisdictions and the similar results in many states, this degree of uncertainty
does not seem large."). One might question whether this 1991 observation by
Thompson has since been undercut somewhat by the growing divergence among
jurisdictions in their piercing jurisprudence. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
48. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
49. This approach, however, would necessarily be somewhat less predictable
as to when courts would reach this choice-of-law result than would be the internal
affairs doctrine approach.
50. See Gevurtz, supra note 6, at 904 ("What about concerns over imposing
inconsistent state rules for corporate governance? Here, one must look at the spe-
cific grounds for piercing .... A more persuasive case for a single standard exists
for piercing based upon ... inadequate capitalization.... Even here, however, we
will not be dealing with a situation (which might exists for some issues in corporate
governance) in which one state could command actions that another prohibits.").
But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, 106 HAv. L. REv. 387, 410-15 (1992) (advocating on uniformity-of-law
grounds for the use of the internal affairs doctrine to impose the law of the state of
incorporation for tort judgment-based piercing claims). Alexander states:
"The internal affairs doctrine responds to the need for a uniform law gov-
erning the structural relationships of corporations that act in numerous states.
To permit each state to impose unlimited shareholder liability through its tort
law would make uniformity impossible, and would thus defeat an important
principle of the substantive law of corporations."
Id. at 413. Of course, no state's piercing law comes anywhere close to imposing
such "unlimited shareholder liability" for all unsatisfied tort judgments against a
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Given all these uncertainties as to the relative efficiency of the
two different choice-of-law approaches, it does not appear possible
to choose between them on that basis. As to the relative equitable
consequences of the two different approaches, the scholarly con-
sensus is that the application of general choice-of-law principles
would be much fairer than the application of the internal affairs
doctrine approach for corporate tort claimants who have no con-
trol over incorporation decisions or over out-of-state lawmakers.
51
These scholars have concluded that equity requires that the legal
rules governing piercing should generally be designed to make it
more difficult for corporations and their shareholders to exter-
nalize the costs of their conduct.52 The application of the internal
affairs doctrine to choose the law of the state of incorporation as
the applicable law for tort judgment-based piercing controversies
would appear to facilitate, rather than retard, such inequitable
externalization.53
Since there is no clear evidence available at this time regarding
the relative efficiency properties of the two different approaches, I
favor the tentative adoption of what I agree with other commenta-
tors is the fairer approach of applying general choice-of-law princi-
ples to determine the applicable body of law for tort judgment-
based piercing controversies.54 This approach would allow courts
the latitude to consider the interests of a jurisdiction in protecting
the legitimate rights and interests of its tort victim citizens against
the inequitable actions of out-of-state corporations and, where ap-
propriate, to apply their own (or yet another) jurisdiction's pierc-
ing jurisprudence. 55 It is therefore preferable to having the courts
apply the law of the state of incorporation in all instances.
56
But what if the piercing claim is based upon a corporate con-
tract obligation? The comparative analysis of the merits of the two
corporation, and therefore Alexander's expressed concerns about the lack of uni-
formity consequences of a move to a more general choice-of-law approach for
piercing controversies seem somewhat exaggerated.
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text
54. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 6, at 904; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
33, at 450-53.
55. See supra note 3 (presenting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) general choice-
of-law framework for tort judgment-based piercing claims pressed by external
parties).
56. Should it be determined at some future time, however, that the internal
affairs doctrine approach has some significant offsetting economic efficiency ad-
vantages over the more general choice-of-law approach, I would then favor recon-
sideration of this question in light of that new evidence.
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different choice-of-law approaches in this context is similar to, but
in some regards more complicated than, the comparable analysis
for tort judgment-based piercing controversies. I will present this
analysis below.
B. Contract-Based Piercing Claims
A corporate contract creditor, at least in theory, has had the
opportunity to negotiate not only a contractual choice-of-law term
governing any disputes with the corporation under the contract,
but also an agreement with the corporation and its shareholders as
to which jurisdiction's law would apply to piercing claims. Courts
should honor such a comprehensive choice-of-law agreement in a
contract, absent any showing that the body of law chosen is some-
how inappropriate (as under other circumstances). Therefore, the
choice-of-law approach that should be followed to govern contract
obligation-based piercing claims should be a default rule that would
apply only when the parties have failed to fully specify their agree-
ment. However, it is exceedingly rare for the parties and the corpo-
ration shareholders to also agree as to which body of law will govern
any piercing attempts that may arise from those contractual obliga-
tions.5 7 The default rule utilized will, therefore, be applied to
choose the governing body of law in almost all contract obligation-
based piercing controversies.
What choice-of-law approach should the courts follow to fill
such a gap in the agreement? The conventional default rule ap-
proach for filling contractual gaps is for courts to attempt to deter-
mine the appropriate implied-in-fact term-to replicate the
hypothetical bargain that the parties would have reached had they
been able to negotiate cosdessly the relevant terms.58 Obviously,
each party to a contract would prefer that the applicable governing
law were the law of the jurisdiction most favorable to that party, all
57. This is in contrast to the common situation in which parties to a corporate
contract include a choice-of-law provision that specifies which body of law will gov-
ern any contractual disputes. I am not personally aware of any situations in which
the parties to a corporate contract have gone beyond including in their agreement
a choice-of-law provision governing contractual disputes to also negotiate choice-
of-law agreements with the corporation and its shareholders that would govern
piercing claims. Parties may sometimes also negotiate shareholder guarantees of
corporate obligations in connection with such contracts, and those guarantees may
include their own choice-of-law provisions, but those provisions generally address
only disputes that may arise under the guarantee contracts and not possible pierc-
ing controversies relating to the underlying corporate obligation.
58. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1989).
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things considered, with the piercing jurisprudence of each jurisdic-
tion being only one aspect of that determination. 59 What choice-of-
law provisions governing piercing attempts would likely be reached
in such hypothetical agreements? What factors should the courts
consider in determining what the parties to a particular piercing
controversy would have agreed to as to the applicable body of law?
This is another question difficult to answer in general terms.
First of all, it is clear that one should not assume that the fact that
the creditor and the corporation have agreed to have the law of the
state of incorporation govern any disputes arising under the con-
tract indicates that the parties would necessarily also want thatjuris-
diction's piercing law to apply when the corporate creditor seeks to
hold a corporate shareholder personally liable.60 The question of
the rights of a corporate creditor against a corporate shareholder
who was not a party to the creditor's contract with the corporation
is distinct from-and collateral to-the rights of the contracting
parties inter se.6 1 The parties involved may wish to have a different
59. A party could, of course, attempt to negotiate a more complex choice-of-
law provision with the laws of different jurisdictions applying to different issues
that may arise under the contract, in an attempt to obtain application of the most
favorable existing body of law for each possible issue. However, in practice one
does not see such detailed negotiations over choice-of-law issues, probably because
the transaction costs involved in reaching such a detailed agreement would be
prohibitive relative to the magnitude of expected benefits. I will therefore make
the simplifying assumption for this Article that each party to a corporate contract
would seek to have the law of a single jurisdiction applied to all disputes that may
arise either under that contract or with regard to possible piercing controversies.
60. See Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 348
(M.D.N.C. 1995) ("Defendant SIO requests the court to apply North Carolina law
on the grounds that the purchase order contained a choice of law provision elect-
ing North Carolina law. However, a choice of law provision in a contract is not
binding on what law to apply for piercing the corporate veil. The reason for this is
that the issue of piercing the corporate veil is collateral to and not part of the
parties' negotiations or expectations with respect to the contract. It involves im-
posing liability on third-party shareholders as opposed to governing the parties'
obligations under the contract."); see also Impulse Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Nat'l Small
Bus. Alliance, No. 05-CV-7776, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42725, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. June
12, 2007); Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Coneco Corp., 339 F. Supp. 2d 425,
440 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); United Trade Assocs. Ltd. v. Dickens & Matson (USA) Ltd.,
Inc., 848 F. Supp. 751, 759 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ("Although the choice of law clause
directs this Court to interpret the contractual dispute under English law, the issue
of piercing the corporate veil is collateral to the contract and thus this Court is not
bound by the choice of law provision.").
61. United Trade Assocs., 848 F. Supp. at 759-60. But see Mercury Time, Inc. v.
Gruen Mktg. Corp., 97-CV-0020 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8026, at *43-44 (E.D.N.Y.
May 26, 1999) ("[W]e apply the choice of law rules of the forum state . .. to
determine what law governs alter ego or piercing the corporate veil analysis. How-
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body of law apply to such piercing controversies than to disputes
arising under the contract that do not involve potential shareholder
liability. The choice by the parties of the law of a jurisdiction to
govern contractual disputes does not necessarily indicate that they
would want the choice-of-law rules of that jurisdiction to also be
used to determine the applicable law for a piercing claim.
62
One can certainly envision that corporations and their share-
holders would commonly favor application of the law of the state of
incorporation to any piercing controversies, particularly if the cor-
poration is incorporated in a jurisdiction, such as Delaware or New
York, that has a relatively restrictive piercingjurisprudence. 63 But it
seems unlikely that the corporation's contract creditors would be
willing to agree to this choice of law without demanding some off-
setting concessions that the corporation and/or its shareholders
might be unwilling to grant, particularly if the creditor and/or the
contract has significant contacts with ajurisdiction with a more per-
missive piercing jurisprudence, which might lead to that jurisdic-
tion's law being applied under a general choice-of-law analysis.
Therefore, determining what the parties to a particular corporate
contract and the corporation's shareholders would have collectively
agreed to as to the choice of law to govern piercing controversies,
had they been able to negotiate this matter, requires a difficult and
very fact-specific inquiry. No general inferences can be drawn sim-
ply from the parties' use of a contractual choice-of-law provision.
And, of course, if the parties have not even included a choice-of-law
provision to govern contractual disputes, there is even less of a basis
for inferring what body of law the parties and the corporation's
shareholders would have wanted to apply to possible later piercing
controversies.
It thus appears that where the parties to a corporate contract
and the corporation's shareholders have not agreed among them-
selves as to the body of law to govern a piercing controversy relating
to that contract, the reviewing court will be faced with a choice
among several alternative courses of action. One possibility would
be for the court to do the focused, fact-specific inquiry necessary to
determine what these particular parties would have likely agreed to
as between the two choice-of-law approaches here considered, had
ever, when the parties have agreed to the application of the forum law [to contract
disputes), their consent concludes the choice of law inquiry [for piercing
claims].") (citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., Dassault Falcon, 909 F. Supp at 348 ("[A] choice of law provision
in a contract is not binding on what law to apply for piercing the corporate veil.").
63. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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they addressed the matter, and follow that approach. A second pos-
sibility would be to simply arbitrarily embrace one or the other of
the two choice-of-law approaches as a default rule without con-
ducting such an inquiry, hoping to motivate prospective con-
tracting parties to engage in bargaining from that default rule
position to expressly choose their preferred governing body of law.
A third tack would be to first handle the question in the same man-
ner as one would approach tortjudgment-based piercing controver-
sies (where there was, of course, no prior choice-of-law agreement
reached among the parties) and balance efficiency and equity con-
siderations in a general way to determine the socially optimal
choice-of-law approach, and impose that approach as a basis for
subsequent bargaining by prospective parties.
The last of these approaches would appear to be the most feasi-
ble and sensible option, given the significant burdens involved in
conducting a fact-specific inquiry as to the parties' likely actions
had they addressed the matter, and given the possibility that any
default rule arbitrarily imposed may prove difficult for some parties
who would ideally favor application of another rule to contract
around. However, as discussed above, there is not sufficient infor-
mation available to determine the comparative efficiency properties
of the two different choice-of-law approaches in the tort judgment-
based piercing claim context,64 and the situation appears to be for
similar reasons the same with regard to contract obligation-based
piercing claims. The selection of a choice-of-law approach there-
fore should again be made on equitable grounds. For the reasons
discussed above with regard to tort judgment-based piercing claims,
I also conclude that the use of general choice-of-law principles to
determine the applicable law to govern these contract obligation-
based piercing controversies would provide the superior framework
for allowing courts the latitude to consider the interests of each
jurisdiction involved in protecting the legitimate rights and inter-
ests of its citizens, and where appropriate to apply their own (or yet
another) jurisdiction's piercing jurisprudence, while still allowing
parties to contract for the applicability of another body of law to
piercing controversies.
My overall conclusion is, therefore, that the courts should ap-
ply general choice-of-law principles to choose the governing body
of law in piercing controversies, whether those claims are based
upon underlying tort judgments or instead upon contract obliga-
tions, except for the rare instance of contract obligation-based
64. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
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piercing claims where the parties involved have specifically agreed
as to the body of law to govern such claims. They should not apply
the law of the state of incorporation to resolve those claims unless
that choice of law is indicated as appropriate by general choice-of-
law principles. The analysis that leads to this conclusion is, as
shown above, rather straightforward. So why have the majority of
courts that have addressed the matter failed to reach this seemingly
obvious result?
The answer here, in my opinion, has to do primarily with some
courts' misunderstanding of the meaning of Restatement (Second)
section 307 and the subsequent precedential force of those errone-
ous rulings.65 Section 307 is a terse provision that is misleading if
read in isolation. A comprehensive textual analysis of the entire
Restatement (Second) and its predecessor, Restatement of Conflicts of
Laws, should lead one to conclude that section 307 does not man-
date application of the law of the state of incorporation to piercing
controversies. However, a more superficial consideration of section
307, apart from its comments and its broader Restatement (Second)
and Restatement of Conflicts of Laws context, can easily lead a court
astray. I will discuss the interpretation of section 307 and the court
rulings applying this provision to piercing controversies in the next
Part of this Article.
III.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 307 OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS
A. A Textual Interpretation of Section 307
Restatement (Second) section 307 is very succinct and is set forth
below in its entirety:
§ 307. Shareholders' Liability
65. Some commentators have argued that there also exist broader economic
and political factors that may influence courts to sometimes apply the law of a
foreign jurisdiction to disputes that, as is sometimes the case for piercing contro-
versies, would be more appropriately resolved under local law. Robert Flannigan,
for example, has argued that in recent years there has been an expansion of the
limitations on liability granted to business entities, both through the adoption of
local statutory limitations and through greater deference shown to the liability lim-
itations contained in the law of the state of chartering of a foreign business entity.
Flannigan argues that this expansion of limitations on liability is due to the fear of
local governments that they would otherwise lose economic activity to other juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Political Path to Limited Liability in Business
Trusts, 31 ADvocAms' Q. 257, 263-73 (2006).
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The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to
determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability
to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to its
creditors for corporate debts.66
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 307. Because of the significance
of this provision, the full text of the comment and of the reporter's note to section
307 is set forth below:
Comment: a. Rationale. Under the local law of most states, a shareholder
is liable for any balance that remains unpaid upon a subscription made by him
to the shares of a corporation. Shareholders of certain corporations, such as
banks and mutual insurance companies, are also made liable in some states
for a further amount, which is generally limited either to the par value of their
shares or to their pro rata portion of the corporation's debts. Sometimes lia-
bility is imposed upon the shareholders for such debts as the corporation in-
curs while engaging in business before its capital stock (or a portion of its
capital stock) has been paid in.
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine
the liability to which a person subjects himself by purchasing, or subscribing
to, shares of a corporation. This law will likewise be applied to determine
whether the shareholder's liability runs to the corporation, or to its creditors,
or to both the corporation and its creditors. The local law of the state of
incorporation will be applied to determine such issues because (1) this is the
law which the shareholders, to the extent that they thought about the ques-
tion, would usually expect to have applied to determine their liability, (2) ex-
clusive application of this law will assure uniform treatment of shareholders or
of classes of shareholders and (3) this state will usually have the dominant
interest in the determination of this issue.
The local law of the state of incorporation may impose liability on the
shareholders for any debt of the corporation, whether liquidated or unliqui-
dated and irrespective of the state where it is payable or where it was incurred.
Such liability may be imposed upon all shareholders. On the other hand, the
local law of the state of incorporation may classify the shareholders and, if the
classification is reasonable, it may impose liability for debts of the corporation
upon some classes and not upon others. Thus, only shareholders who have
not fully paid for their shares or who have paid otherwise than in cash may be
made liable to creditors of the corporation for its debts.
b. As to the law which will be applied to determine who are shareholders
of a corporation, see § 303.
c. The method of enforcing a shareholder's liability by proceedings
outside the state of incorporation is considered in § 308.
d. Reference is to "local law" of state of incorporation. The reference is to the
"local law" of the state of incorporation and not to that state's "law," which
means the totality of its law including its choice-of-law rules.
e. A court will refuse to entertain a cause of action that is penal or that is
contrary to a strong local public policy (see §§ 89-90).
REPORTER'S NOTE [citations omitted]. Liabilities imposed upon share-
holders offoreign corporation. A state may impose liability upon a shareholder of
a foreign corporation for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the
state's relationship to the shareholder is sufficient to make reasonable the im-
position of such liability upon him. [citations omitted].
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Since, as will be discussed below, courts have taken the sparse
language of section 307 very seriously and literally, a textual analysis
of that section, such as one would normally apply to a statute rather
than to a Restatement provision, is in order. Section 307, on its
face, appears to support the internal affairs doctrine choice-of-law
approach to piercing controversies, since both the contract obliga-
tions of and the tort judgments against a corporation are "corpo-
rate debts," and a successful piercing claim makes the target
shareholder liable to the corporate creditor to whom that debt was
owed. However, if one carries out a more comprehensive textual
analysis that considers also the comment and reporter's note to sec-
tion 307, as well as the related Restatement (Second) introduction and
sections 297, 302, and 306 and their comments, it becomes rela-
tively clear that it was not the intent of the drafters of section 307 to
mandate the application of the law of the state of incorporation to
all piercing claims. In addition, if one also reads the provisions of
the earlier Restatement of Conflicts of Laws from which the relevant
Restatement (Second) provisions were derived, it becomes even clearer
that section 307 was not intended to accomplish this end.
Let me first discuss how Restatement (Second) sections 297, 302,
and 306, the comments to sections 297, 302, and 307, and the re-
porter's note to section 307, together make clear the intent of the
drafters that section 307 not be given a literal, simplistic reading
that would necessarily impose the law of the state of incorporation
for all piercing controversies. I will then discuss how this conclu-
sion is given further support by the text of the predecessor Restate-
ment of Conflicts of Laws and by the introduction to the Restatement
(Second), which explains what the drafters of that document were
trying to accomplish with their comprehensive revisions to the orig-
inal Restatement of Conflicts of Laws.
Restatement (Second) section 302 addresses certain choice-of-law
issues that may arise with respect to the rights and duties of a corpo-
ration, and it states in qualified fashion that the law of the state of
incorporation will generally be applied to resolve such issues "ex-
cept in the unusual case where ... some other state has a more
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied."67 Section 302
thus creates merely a rebuttable presumption in favor of applica-
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 302. Section 302 is tided "Other
Issues with Respect to Powers and Liabilities of a Corporation," and states in its
entirety:
(1) Issues involving the rights and liabilities of a corporation, other than those
dealt with in § 301, are determined by the local law of the state which, with
0
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tion of the law of the state of incorporation to issues relating to
corporate rights or duties, one that can be overcome by a showing
of a more significant relationship of another jurisdiction under
general choice-of-law principles.68 This intent is made even clearer
by comment e to that section, which states that while internal corpo-
rate governance matters must for practical reasons be consistently
governed by the law of the state of incorporation, 69 this is not true
for "the making of contracts, the commission of torts and the trans-
fer of property. There is no reason why corporate acts of the latter
sort should not be governed by the local law of different states.
70
Section 302 thus was not intended to mandate the application
of the law of the state of incorporation for issues relating to corpo-
rate contract or tort obligations, let alone for issues relating to the
collateral matter of shareholder personal liability running directly
to creditors for those obligations. Comment e draws a distinction
between those internal governance issues-in which uniform treat-
ment is paramount-and those contractual or tort liability issues-
in which the application of local law may well be more appropri-
ate. 71 While section 302 and its comments do not specifically ad-
dress personal shareholder liability through piercing claims, such
piercing claims are grounded upon corporation contract or tort ob-
ligations to external creditors, areas in which, unlike in internal
governance matters, uniformity is not a critical consideration. Ac-
cordingly, comment e's statement that there is no reason local law
respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the oc-
currence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine
such issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
69. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 3, § 302, cmt. e ("[M]any matters in-
volving a corporation cannot practicably be determined differently in different
states. Examples. .. include steps taken in the course of the original incorpora-
tion, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws,
the issuance of corporate shares... the holding of directors' and shareholders'
meetings, methods of voting including any requirement for cumulative voting, the
declaration and payment of dividends and other distributions, charter amend-
ments, mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations, the reclassification of shares
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should not be applied to contract or tort issues would appear ger-
mane to providing guidance in the piercing context as well.72
Restatement (Second) section 306 addresses the choice of law for
disputes regarding the obligations owed by the majority sharehold-
ers of a corporation to the minority shareholders. 73 It notes that
the relationship between a majority shareholder and the minority
shareholders is an internal affair that should generally be governed
by the law of the state of incorporation, but in circumstances in
which another state has a more significant relationship to the par-
ties involved, that other state's law should govern. 74 This provi-
sion's recognition of the primacy of the "most significant
relationship" principle over the internal affairs doctrine presump-
tion for even a quintessential internal affair such as intra-share-
holder relationships strongly suggests that the Restatement (Second)
drafters would want this general choice-of-law approach to also be
given primacy for piercing claims raised by external corporate
creditors.
Restatement (Second) section 297 succinctly states that "Incorpo-
ration by one state will be recognized by other states."75 Comment
c to that section elaborates more fully on what the drafters intended
by that provision with regard to shareholder liabilities:
c. Limitation of shareholders' liability. Insofar as this protection is
accorded them in the state of incorporation, a state will usually
recognize the immunity of the shareholders of a foreign corpo-
72. Hansmann and Kraakman also argue that section 302 and comment e to
that section undercut the argument for a literal, simplistic reading of section 307.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 450-51. Their conclusion, however, is
that while section 302 and its comment together suggest that section 307 should
not be read as mandating the application of the law of the state of incorporation to
tort judgment-based piercing claims-a position that I agree with-section 307
should be so understood with regard to contract obligation piercing claims-a po-
sition that I reject in this Article. Id. at 451.
73. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 306 ("Liability of Majority Share-
holder. The obligations owed by a majority shareholder to the corporation and to
the minority shareholders will be determined by the local law of the state of incor-
poration, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in
§ 6 to the parties and the corporation, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied."); see also Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corp., No. CIV.A.95-5284,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14563, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1997) ("Section 307 cannot
be read in a vacuum; rather, Section 307 must be read in conjunction with Section
306... [a]nd, 'contrasting Section 307 with Section 306... shows that the Restate-
ment did not mean for section 307 to be applied in cases such as that present
here.'") (citation omitted).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 306.
75. Id. § 297.
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ration from being sued as individuals on matters arising out of
the acts or omissions of the corporation .... 76
Section 297 was thus again intended only to create a rebuttable
presumption that the law of the state of incorporation be applied to
govern piercing controversies, one that could be rebutted under
the unusual circumstances of the parties' and/or the controversy's
having more significant contacts with another jurisdiction.
Turning to Restatement (Second) section 307 itself, we can see
that its comments give no examples that definitively clarify whether
the section's "corporate debts" phrase is intended to apply only in
those instances in which a shareholder has not fully satisfied his
assessment responsibilities or contribution to corporate capital obli-
gations, or instead is intended to apply more broadly to all corpora-
tion contract and/or tort obligations as well. 77 Comment a begins
byjustifying the general application of the law of the state of incor-
poration to shareholder liability questions on shareholder expecta-
tions and uniformity of treatment grounds,78 and further states that
the "state [of incorporation] will usually have the dominant interest
in the determination of this issue."79 It then notes that the local law
of the state of incorporation may impose liability for corporate obli-
gations on some or all of the corporation's shareholders.80 How-
ever, comment a then concludes with a much more restrictive
summary declaration: "Thus, only shareholders who have not fully
paid for their shares or who have paid otherwise than in cash may
be liable to creditors of the corporation for its debts."8 1
This conclusion as to the very limited scope of section 307
shareholder liability, along with the comment's failure to provide
other examples of shareholder liability that section 307 would im-
pose, suggests, as do sections 302 and 306, that section 307 is in-
tended to address only the question of shareholder liability for
corporate debts under circumstances in which shareholders have
not met their initial assessment or capital contribution obligations
to the corporation. It suggests that it was not intended to apply
more generally to impose the law of the state of incorporation upon
76. Id. § 297 cmt. c (emphasis added).
77. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 451; see also Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 1313, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7051, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1988) (arguing that section 307 has no applica-
tion to piercing controversies and addresses only the situation in which share-
holder liability would be based solely upon the ownership of shares without more).




Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
2008] CHOICE-OF-LAW IN VEIL-PIERCING LITIGATION 115
piercing claims that do not involve such contribution deficiencies,
although, in my opinion, this comment alone is not clear enough to
necessarily compel such a conclusion.82 This narrower interpreta-
tion of the intended scope of section 307 is, however, given even
further support by the brief reporter's note to that section, which
directly contradicts any interpretation of section 307 that would
mandate application of the law of the state of incorporation to all
piercing controversies, stating that this law should be imposed only
when "reasonable," presumably with regard to the application of
general choice-of-law principles. The full text of that reporter's
note is given below:
Liabilities imposed upon shareholders of foreign corporation. A state
may impose liability upon a shareholder of a foreign corpora-
tion for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the
state's relationship to the shareholder is sufficient to make rea-
sonable the imposition of such liability upon him.83
Consideration of these other portions of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) thus indicates that a literal, simplistic reading of the facially
broad "shareholder's liability... for corporate debts"8 4 phrase of
section 307 would be inappropriate and that section 307 is better
read as establishing only, at most, a rebuttable presumption that
the law of the state of incorporation should be applied to piercing
controversies and that a general choice-of-law analysis should be
conducted before this determination is made.
Consideration of the relevant provisions of the predecessor Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws and of the Introduction to the Restate-
ment (Second) also provides further support for this interpretation of
82. Another commentator, Mark Patterson, does take the position that com-
ment a to section 307 makes it quite clear that section 307 was intended by its
drafters to apply only to shareholder liability for deficient initial contributions and
not to questions of shareholder liability to a corporation creditor. See Mark R.
Patterson, Is Unlimited Liability Really Unattainable? Of Long Arms and Short Sales, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 863 (1995) ("Although this section [307] appears at first glance
to he helpful, and is treated as dispositive [in favor of imposing the law of the state
of incorporation to piercing controversies] by Professor Alexander, the comments
to section 307 make clear that it applies only to the situation in which 'liability is
imposed upon the shareholders for such debts as the corporation incurs while
engaging in business before its capital stock (or a portion of its capital stock) has
been paid in.' Neither section [301 or 307], then, decides which law should gov-
ern the liability to a third party of a shareholder of a corporation following the
corporation's initial capitalization.") (referring to Alexander, supra note 50, at
410-15).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 307 reporter's note.
84. Id. § 307.
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
section 307. The most relevant provision of the Restatement of Con-
flicts of Laws is section 185, which provides:
Shareholders' Liability to Assessments or Contribution. The exis-
tence and extent of the liability of a shareholder for assess-
ments or contribution to the corporation for the payment of
debts of the corporation is determined by the law of the state
of incorporation.85
The close parallels between the text of section 185 and that of
Restatement (Second) section 307 show that section 185 was the main
predecessor to section 307. It differs from the later provision in
wording only, in subtle yet significant ways. First, the title of section
185 is much more closely focused on assessment and capital contri-
bution issues than is the broader "Shareholder's Liability" title of
Restatement (Second) section 307. Second, the language of section
185 speaks only to shareholder liability to the corporation for as-
sessments or contributions and not to liability running directly to
corporate creditors for corporation obligations. Comment a to sec-
tion 185 makes clear the intended narrow scope of section 185, stat-
ing: "The rule stated in this Section is applicable to the creation of
liabilities of a shareholder for assessment by or contributions to the
corporation itself. Direct liability of shareholders to the creditors of
the corporation may be imposed by states other than that of incor-
poration (see Section 191)."86 Section 191 is, in turn, a provision
that calls for the application of the law of the state where the rele-
vant acts were done by a corporation that is incorporated in an-
other state, rather than the law of the state of incorporation, under
a broad set of circumstances.87
Under the original Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, therefore,
section 185 mandates the application of the law of the state of in-
corporation only in those matters in which shareholder liability to
the corporation for capital contribution deficiencies is at issue. It
clearly defers to section 191 to address choice-of-law questions with
regard to the issue of direct shareholder liability to corporate credi-
tors of corporations not locally incorporated.88 Section 191, in
turn, implicitly endorses a general choice-of-law analysis by calling
for the application of local law to these issues where the target
shareholder has the requisite contacts with that jurisdiction.8 9
85. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICrS OF LAwS § 185 (1934).
86. Id. cmt. a.
87. See id. § 191.
88. Id. § 185.
89. Id. § 191.
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There is no precise analog to section 191 of the original Restate-
ment of Conflicts of Laws included in the Restatement (Second). It thus
appears that Restatement (Second) section 307 was intended by its
drafters to consolidate sections 185 and 191 of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws into a single, more succinct provision. However, the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) appear to have inadvertently
overlooked the point that these two Restatement of Conflict of Laws
provisions impose different choice-of-law rules for the two different
forms of shareholder liability, one running to the corporation in
instances of assessment or contribution deficiencies and the other
running directly to corporation creditors. While Restatement (Sec-
ond) section 307 is based primarily on the wording of Restatement of
Conflicts of Laws section 185, there is nothing in the comments to
section 307 evidencing an intent to impose the section 185 law of
the state of incorporation mandate to also govern shareholder obli-
gations formerly addressed with a different choice-of-law approach
under Restatement of Conflicts of Laws section 191. As discussed
above, what germane comments and reporter's notes do exist in the
Restatement (Second) in fact suggest the contrary. The choice-of-law
approach that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) wanted to be
applied to determine the body of law governing shareholder obliga-
tions to corporate creditors in piercing controversies remains the
Restatement of Conflicts of Laws section 191 general choice-of-law prin-
ciples approach.
In addition, the introduction to the Restatement (Second) makes
clear that the essential thrust of the entire extensive drafting effort
was to replace the rigid rules of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws
with standards of greater flexibility.90 An interpretation of section
307 that would force different shareholder liability situations that
are addressed by different choice-of-law rules under sections 185
and 191 of the Restatement of Conflicts of Laws to be addressed in a
uniform fashion that ignores relevant distinctions would seem to
directly counter the purpose of the revisions embodied by the Re-
statement (Second).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, at vii ("[There has been an] enor-
mous change in dominant judicial thought respecting conflicts problems that has
taken place in relatively recent years. The essence of that change has been the
jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid rules in favor of standards of greater flexibility,
according sensitivity in judgment to important values that were formerly ig-
nored .... [B]lack-letter formulations often must consist of open-ended stan-
dards .... That technique is not unique to Conflicts but the situation here has
called for its employment quite pervasively throughout these volumes. The result
presents a striking contrast to the first Restatement in which dogma was so thor-
oughly enshrined.").
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In summary, it is evident that, read in isolation, the literal text
of section 307 can be read to suggest that the law of the state of
incorporation should be applied to all piercing controversies. How-
ever, a more comprehensive analysis of the Restatement (Second)
clearly indicates that the appropriate interpretation of that section
is to create, at most, a rebuttable presumption that the law of the
state of incorporation be applied, and that, moreover, the courts
should first conduct a general choice-of-law analysis giving proper
weight to the interests of each of the jurisdictions that have signifi-
cant contacts with the parties or with the transaction at issue before
choosing the governing law. So how have the courts handled this
question? Let me now turn to the relevant cases.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 307
The Restatement (Second) was officially promulgated in 1969 af-
ter going through a process of numerous preliminary drafts for al-
most two decades.9' Since that date, there have been only a modest
number of cases invoking section 307 in the piercing context.92 As
I will discuss below on a case-by-case basis, the courts that have ap-
plied this provision have been drastically split over whether the pro-
vision calls for the application of the law of the state of
incorporation to all piercing controversies or merely creates, at
most, a rebuttable presumption in favor of applying that state's
91. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) was the result of a extensive seventeen-year
effort, commencing in 1952 and culminating in 1969. Over that period the draft-
ers produced twenty-five Council Drafts, twenty-one Preliminary Drafts, and nine
Preliminary Proposed Final Drafts. The Final Draft has since been further supple-
mented on several occasions, with the last revised version published in 1988. See
American Law Institute Archives, Second Restatement of Law Records, http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/xml/ali2.xml#series2; see also American Law In-
stitute, Past and Present ALI Projects (2007), http://www.ali.org/doc/past_
presentALIprojects.pdf.
92. Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cendant Corp., No. 3:03-CV-00029-TMB, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55474, at *28-29 (D. AlaskaJuly 27, 2007); United States v. ERGS, Inc.,
No. 03:02-CV-0615-LRH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2007);
Schwan v. CNH Am. LLC, No. 4:04-CV-3384, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28516, at *58
(D. Neb. May 4, 2006); Direct Energy Mktg., Ltd. v. Duke/Louis Dreyfus LLC, No.
3:99CV1942, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14356, at *8-10 (D. Conn. June 13, 2001) (ap-
plying the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation, but only after conducting a
general choice-of-law analysis, and citing section 307 in dicta); Autrey v. 22 Texas
Servs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Maltz v. Union Carbide
Chems. & Plastics Co., 992 F. Supp. 286, 300 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re World
Vision Entre't, Inc., 275 B.R. 641, 661-62 (Bankr. M.D. Fl. 2002) (applying the law
of the state of incorporation, but only after conducting a general choice-of-law
analysis); Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Inst. Servs., 832 N.E.2d 666, 674 n.15 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005).
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law.93 As noted above, the casebooks and academic commentators
have recognized this split of authority.9.4 Moreover, none of the
cases that have interpreted section 307 as calling for the sweeping
application of the law of the state of incorporation have gone be-
yond a superficial textualist justification and offered any plausible
policy justifications for taking that tack.
For the first two-plus decades after the promulgation of the Re-
statement (Second), there was relatively little judicial attention paid to
section 307. Only a handful of cases through 1991 cited the provi-
sion. The earliest judicial reference to section 307 of which I am
aware was in 1980 in Realco Services, Inc. v. Holt,95 a case involving an
attempt by New York corporation creditors to pierce the corporate
veil of a New Jersey corporation in a Pennsylvania federal court.96
In Realco, the court noted in a footnote, without elaboration, that
"New Jersey law controls the question of formal corporate exis-
tence," citing Restatement (Second) sections 298 and 307 in support of
that position. 97 That opinion suggests, but does not clearly em-
brace, the position that section 307 calls broadly for the application
of the law of the state of incorporation to all piercing controver-
sies.98 It certainly does not engage in any sustained analysis as to
whether the application of the law of the state of incorporation to
all piercing controversies is a good idea that would merit deference
to the persuasive authority of section 307, even assuming that provi-
sion is interpreted in that manner.
The next case citing section 307 was decided in 1983. In Klika
v. Aerolite SPE Corp.,99 an Ohio federal court held, without extensive
discussion, in a contract obligation-based piercing controversy, that
section 307 "requires that the law of the state of incorporation ap-
93. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
95. 513 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
96. Id. at 439.
97. Id. at 442 n.8.
98. To further support this somewhat ambiguous proposition, Realco also cites
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 298, which calls for courts to treat corporations
that have met their state of incorporation's formal requirements as corporations of
the states in which those courts sit with regard to the applicable formalities. Id. at
n.8; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 3, § 298. Section 298 does not specifically
address veil-piercing choice-of-law issues. RESTATEMENT (SECoND), SUpra note 3,
§ 298. The Realco decision should therefore perhaps be read more narrowly as
addressing choice-of-law questions only with regard to determining whether a cor-
poration has met the necessary formalities imposed by state law to qualify for cor-
porate status, and not as addressing veil-piercing attempts.
99. No. C82-522, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11023 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 1983,
amended Jan. 7, 1984).
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plies in an action to pierce the corporate veil."100 The ruling also
appeared to be based simply on a literal reading of the text of sec-
tion 307, without further analysis.
The next judicial reference to section 307 did not come until
1988. In Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.,1°1 a federal dis-
trict court sitting as a Louisiana state court for a piercing contro-
versy concluded that there was "little doubt" that a Louisiana court
would apply the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation (Bermuda),
citing in support of this position both section 307 and the general
embrace of the underlying Restatement (Second) premises by Louisi-
ana courts. 10 2 However, that court also noted that the Restatement
(Second) provisions "contemplate the application of interest analysis
to piercing the corporate veil claims." 10 3 The court ultimately
chose to apply the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation because
that jurisdiction had greater interests in the matter than did the
jurisdiction of Louisiana,10 4 thus reducing its invocation of section
307 as providing support for the application of the law of the juris-
diction of incorporation to dicta.
A second 1988 case, Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Ex-
press Service Ltd.,105 also cited section 307, but it interpreted it nar-
rowly as applying only to questions of shareholder liability for
corporate obligations that may arise solely on account of the share-
holder's owning shares without more; it further held that this provi-
sion had no relevance to piercing controversies where it was alleged
that the target shareholder had engaged in inequitable conduct. 0 6
100. Id. at *8 n.5.
101. 683 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. La. 1988).
102. Id. at 1072.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1072-73.
105. No. 86 Civ. 1313, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1988).
106. Id. at *12-15 ("The fact of incorporation in a foreign state is but one
contact, and it falls far short of being the most relevant one.... Section 307 refers
to the liability to which a person subjects himself merely by holding shares in a
corporation, and has no bearing on the extraordinary situation in which the privi-
lege of incorporation has been abused to the detriment of a third party. Nor is the
rationale of the Section pertinent here, inasmuch as it fails to take account of the
interests of third parties.... The Reporter's Note to Section 307, indeed, recog-
nizes that '[a] state may impose liability upon a shareholder of a foreign corpora-
tion for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the state's relationship to the
shareholders is sufficient to make reasonable the imposition of such liability upon
him.'... The better reasoned view weighs in the balance the contacts of the third
party with the state of incorporation.... Where those contacts are nil, fairness to
the third party does not permit the introduction of foreign law upon nothing
more substantial than the circumstance of incorporation in a foreign state.") (in-
ternal citations omitted).
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That court refused to apply the law of the state of incorporation to
the piercing controversy since the defendant corporation had con-
ducted no business in its state of incorporation. 10 7
In re Blanton s0 8 was a 1989 case in which a Texas federal court
cited section 307 for the proposition that the law of the state of
incorporation should be applied to all piercing controversies.10 9
That statement, however, was only dictum because the parties in
that case did not dispute the applicable law.110 In 1990, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v.
Banks, 1 ' cited section 307 as providing support for application of
the law of the state of incorporation' 12 in discussing (again in dicta)
the issues presented by the choice-of-law question, but the court did
not attempt to definitively resolve this question.1 1 3
The next case citing section 307 was a 1991 opinion, Foster v.
Berwind Corp.'1 4 In that case, the plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Insur-
ance Commissioner, sought to pierce a subsidiary corporation
chartered in Bermuda, but which did no business there, to hold its
Pennsylvania-chartered corporate parent liable for certain contrac-
tual debts of the subsidiary.1 15 The Pennsylvania federal court hear-
ing the case cited section 307 for the proposition that the law of the
state of incorporation should be applied to piercing controversies,
but it held that section 307 was inapplicable to the particular situa-
tion before it; instead, the court stated that section 306 governed
the case before it and that section 306 specifically called for a more
general choice-of-law analysis rather than application of the law of
incorporation.1 6 The court then applied local Pennsylvania law to
the dispute on the basis of its analysis.1 17
The Foster court's invocation of section 306 to govern the dis-
pute is facially inappropriate, given that section 306 by its explicit
terms applies only to intra-shareholder disputes and not to piercing
controversies.' 1 8 The court apparently understood section 307 as
calling for the application of the law of the jurisdiction of incorpo-
107. Id. at *15.
108. 105 B.R. 811 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
109. Id. at 821.
110. Id.
111. 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990).
112. Id. at 1575-76 n.18.
113. See id.
114. No. 90-0857, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1988 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1991).
115. Id. at *1.
116. Id. at *3-5.
117. Id. at *6.
118. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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ration; in the situation before the court, in which the subject corpo-
ration had no meaningful contact with the jurisdiction of
incorporation except for the act of incorporation, the court did not
like that result and found another way to justify to its satisfaction
conducting a more general choice-of-law analysis that led to the ap-
plication of another jurisdiction's laws.
These seven early judicial opinions citing section 307 during
the first two-plus decades after its promulgation thus provide, at
most, very ambivalent and qualified support for interpretation of
that provision as calling for the application of the law of the state of
incorporation to all piercing controversies. Klika flatly held that
section 307 "requires" that the law of the state of incorporation be
applied to all piercing controversies. 19 The Realco Services, Blanton,
and Foster opinions each seem to implicitly accept the interpreta-
tion that section 307 at least recommends that result, 20 though
none of these opinions includes any supporting analysis that would
justify this interpretation. The Kempe opinion, in contrast, quotes
section 307 without comment as to its scope of application, but
then, in effect, subordinates that provision to the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s overall policy of favoring a more general choice-of-law analy-
sis.121 And at the other extreme, the Itel Containers court, in the
only one of these early section 307 opinions that analyzes the ques-
tion in any depth, flatly rejects any interpretation of section 307
that would call for application of the law of the state of incorpora-
tion to all piercing controversies.1 22 That court instead regards sec-
tion 307 as addressing the choice of law only in those cases in which
shareholder liability might be imposed solely on the basis of a per-
son's owning shares without more and takes the view that it is inap-
plicable altogether to piercing controversies in which inequitable
shareholder conduct is alleged, where instead general choice-of-law
principles should be applied.123
Despite this rather sparse and conflicting body of early prece-
dents, a number of opinions issued in the mid-1990s assumed, as if
119. Klika v. Aerolite SPE Corp., No. C82-522, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11023, at
*8 n.5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 1983, amended Jan. 7, 1984). The RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) provides, of course, only persuasive and not mandatory authority, so the
Klika court is obviously incorrect in stating that section 307 "requires" the applica-
tion of the law of the state of incorporation. However, the opinion is clear that the
court interprets section 307 as recommending this position.
120. See supra notes 95-98, 108-10, and 114-18 and accompanying text.
121. See notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
122. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
123. See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd, No. 86
Civ. 1313, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7051, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1988).
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it were a matter of settled law not requiring further justification,
that section 307 called for application of the law of the state of in-
corporation to all piercing controversies.1 24 Some other courts dur-
ing that period (or earlier) also reached the same conclusion as to
the application of the law of the state of incorporation to all pierc-
ing controversies without invoking section 307.125 There have been
additional rulings since the mid-1990s that take this same position
regarding section 307.126 On the other hand, several later courts
have followed the rationale of Itel Containers and rejected an inter-
pretation of section 307 that requires application of the law of the
state of incorporation to all piercing controversies, and they have
instead applied general choice-of-law principles to choose the gov-
erning body of law. 127
124. See, e.g., Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp., 8 F.3d 130, 132-33 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("Texas substantive law applies to this alter ego claim because Texas is
the place of... incorporation.") (citing without discussion RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
section 307); Maltz v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 992 F. Supp. 286, 300
n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the law of the state of incorporation to a piercing
controversy and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 307 in support of this re-
sult); Amoco Chem. Co. v. Tex. Tin Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1192, 1201 (S.D. Tex.
1996); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[Section 307 and prior Florida cases suggest] that Delaware law
[the law of the state of incorporation] . . . would apply in a suit to pierce the
corporate veil.. . ."); Realmark Inv. Co. v. Am. Fin. Corp., 171 B.R. 692, 694 (N.D.
Ga. 1994) ("[I]t appears to the Court that the Georgia Supreme Court would fol-
low the Restatement [(Second) of Conflicts of Laws], and the Court holds that the
state of incorporation's law applies to issues of piercing the corporate veil.") (cit-
ing without discussion RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 307); In re R.C.S. Engi-
neered Prods. Co. v. Himmelspach, 168 B.R. 598, 602 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994).
125. See, e.g., RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d. 543, 545-46 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying the "alter ego" doctrine in accordance with state law); Jefferson
Pilot Broad. Co. v. Hilary & Hogan, Inc., 617 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1980) (apply-
ing Alabama law in accordance with the original Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws);
Heyman v. Beatrice Co., No. 89-C-7381,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4135, at *19-20
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1995); Soviet Pan Am Travel Effort v. Travel Comm., Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 126, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[T]he state of incorporation has the greater in-
terest in determining when and if [to allow piercing]."); United Nat'l Records, Inc.
v. MCA, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (N.D. Il. 1985).
126. See, e.g., Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cendant Corp., No. 3:03-CV-00029-
TMB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55474, at *28-29 (D. Alaska July 27, 2007); United
States v. ERGS, Inc., No. 03:02-CV-0615-LRH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at *6 (D.
Nev. Jan. 22, 2007); Autrey v. 22 Tex. Servs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (S.D.
Tex. 2000); Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Inst. Servs., 832 N.E.2d 666, 674 n.15 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005) (dicta applying the law of the state of incorporation in a piercing
controversy, and citing without discussion RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section 307 in
support of this ruling).
127. See, e.g., Schwan v. CNH Am. LLC, No. 4:04-CV-3384, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28516, at *58 (D. Neb. May 4, 2006) (applying the local Nebraska law rather
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In summary, the section 307 case law consists of, first, a modest
number of judicial opinions that apply a literal and simplistic tex-
tual analysis and call for applying the law of the state of incorpora-
tion to all piercing controversies and, second, a smaller number of
opinions that consider also the underlying policy of the Restatement
(Second) to encourage a broader choice-of-law analysis that takes
into account the interests of all affected jurisdictions. These latter
cases then-not surprisingly-conclude that section 307 was not in-
tended to impose the law of the state of incorporation to piercing
controversies except when a more general choice-of-law analysis
suggested that this is the appropriate body of law.
The latter group of courts has it right as to the interpretation
of section 307. A broader textual analysis and reflection upon the
underlying policy considerations justify their conclusions. As I have
noted above, one could perhaps argue that the courts that have
misinterpreted section 307 have, in at least some instances, been
covertly attempting to make their jurisdictions more attractive as a
locus of business operations to those foreign corporations
chartered in states with a relatively more restrictive piercing juris-
prudence. 128 However, I think that these errors of interpretation
can be adequately explained by the simple fact that section 307 is
easy to misunderstand if it is read in isolation, rather than along
with its comments and reporter's note and in its broader Restatement
(Second) context, and the facially absolute language of that provi-
sion has unfortunately encouraged courts to avoid conducting this
more extensive and time-consuming interpretive effort. Further-
than the Delaware law of the state of incorporation to a piercing controversy);
Direct Energy Mktg., Ltd. v. Duke/Louis Dreyfus LLC, No. 3:99GV1942, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14356, at *8-10 (D. Conn. June 13, 2001) (applying the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation, but only after conducting a general choice-of-law
analysis, and citing section 307 in dicta); Curiale v. Tiber Holding Corp., No.
CIV.A.95-5284, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14563, at *33-37 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1997)
(citing Itel Containers in support of applying general choice-of-law principles in
piercing controversies involving the rights of parties external to the corporation);
Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F. Supp. 1097, 1102-03 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
("In general terms, [section 307 applies] . .. the law of the state of incorporation
except where another state has a more significant relationship to the parties and
the transaction.") (citing also section 309, cmt. a); Bankard v. First Carolina
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 89-G-8571, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17916, at *35-39 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 5, 1991) (citing section 307 and ultimately applying the law of the state of
incorporation to a piercing claim, but only after conducting a general choice-of-
law analysis); In re World Vision Entm't, Inc., 275 B.R. 641, 661-62 (Bankr. M.D.
Fl. 2002) (applying the law of the state of incorporation, but only after conducting
a general choice-of-law analysis).
128. See Flannigan, supra note 65, at 263-73.
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more, such misunderstandings have now created a body of prece-
dential authority, which has made it even easier for later courts,
which may wish to avoid making the considerable efforts required
to revisit first principles of choice of law whenever settled law makes




A. Choice of Law in Corporate Veil-Piercing Litigation
Given the divergence among jurisdictions as to their piercing
law, the choice-of-law approach followed can have outcome-deter-
minative consequences. The choice-of-law issue thus gives rise to
preliminary procedural struggles, which make it more difficult and
expensive to reach the merits of piercing controversies. It would be
more efficient if the choice-of-law question were definitively re-
solved in favor of the better approach.
The general choice-of-law approach that considers and bal-
ances the interests of all jurisdictions that are involved is, in my
opinion, the better approach for determining the applicable law for
both tort judgment-based and contract obligation-based piercing
claims than is summary application of the law of the state of incor-
poration under the internal affairs doctrine. Unfortunately, it is
not possible at this time to offer a definitive assessment as to which
choice-of-law approach would better promote overall economic effi-
ciency, although it does appear that the significance of the predict-
ability and uniformity advantages often claimed for the internal
affairs doctrine approach is overstated in the piercing context.
However, the general choice-of-law approach is clearly more equita-
ble to both corporate tort judgment and contract creditors. In par-
ticular, this approach removes the ability of corporations and their
shareholders to limit the shareholders' exposure to piercing claims
merely by selectively incorporating or reincorporating in jurisdic-
tions such as Delaware or New York that have a relatively restrictive
piercing jurisprudence, and thereby externalizing the conse-
quences of their inequitable conduct, while still allowing the parties
the freedom to expressly contract for whatever body of law that they
wish to have govern piercing controversies.
The majority of courts that have considered the issue have un-
fortunately followed the internal affairs doctrine approach. How-
ever, those courts have not done so because they have considered
and rejected the policy arguments that I have offered in this Article
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in favor of the general choice-of-law approach, but instead because
they have relied upon a literal and simplistic reading of section 307
of the Restatement (Second) that they have construed in isolation with-
out also considering the other relevant sections, comments, and re-
porter's notes and the underlying purposes of the Restatement
(Second).129 Other courts, however, have considered section 307 in
this broader context and have understood it to, at most, create a
rebuttable presumption that the law of the state of incorporation
be applied-a presumption that should then be evaluated and in
some instances overcome through a more general choice-of-law
assessment.
These latter courts have it right, in my opinion, and I recom-
mend that allcourts henceforth utilize general choice-of-law princi-
ples to select the applicable body of law to apply to piercing
controversies raised in the corporate context, whether those con-
troversies are based upon underlying tort judgments or instead
upon contract obligations. The only exception to this principle
that I would allow are those exceedingly rare instances of contract
obligation-based piercing claims in which the corporate creditor,
the corporation, and the target shareholder(s) have all specifically
agreed not only as to which body of law shall govern any disputes
arising under the contract, but also as to which jurisdiction's laws
shall govern any piercing claims that may later arise.
B. Choice of Law in Piercing Litigation Involving
Non-Corporate Entities
Choice-of-law issues similar to those discussed above can also
arise when a tort or contract creditor of a non-corporate limited
liability entity, such as a limited liability partnership or limited lia-
bility limited partnership (hereinafter "LLP" or "LLLP"), or a lim-
ited liability company (hereinafter "LLC"), seeks to have an LLP or
LLLP general partner or an LLC member held personally liable for
the entity's obligation. The choice-of-law questions presented in
these non-corporate contexts are in some instances broader in
scope than those that I have here discussed and, consequently, may
be outcome-determinative under a broader range of circumstances.
This is so because there may not only be differences in the relevant
piercing jurisprudence across jurisdictions for a particular entity
form, but also differences in the extent of limited liability protec-
129. But see id. (suggesting that there may be a covert and more political ratio-
nale underlying these decisions).
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tion provided under the relevant chartering statutes'30 and differ-
ences as to whether a particular entity form is permitted at all to
conduct certain types of business as a limited liability vehicle in that
jurisdiction.131 Under those latter circumstances, the choice of law
may be outcome-determinative even if the piercing jurisprudence is
identical across the relevant jurisdictions.
My analysis of choice-of-law issues in the corporate veil-piercing
context leads to a similar conclusion for the LLP, LLLP, and LLC
contexts. The applicable body of law for resolving a controversy in
which an entity creditor seeks to have an LLP or LLLP general part-
ner or LLC member held personally liable for an entity obligation,
whether under a veil-piercing theory or under the theory that the
applicable law does not provide protections against personal liabil-
ity for entity obligations even absent a justification for piercing,
should be determined through application of general choice-of-law
principles. The law of the state of organization of the entity should
not be imposed by analogy to the corporate internal affairs doc-
trine. The rationale for this conclusion is exactly the same as dis-
cussed above in the corporate veil-piercing context. Such
controversies are better regarded as external matters based upon
the creditor's claim against the entity than as internal affairs relat-
ing to the LLP or LLLP partner's or LLC member's relationship to
the entity, and therefore the choice of law should be guided by gen-
eral choice-of-law principles that better address and balance the in-
terests and equities involved than does the internal affairs rule.
Some commentators have, however, argued that application of
the law of the state of organization of the entity is appropriate in
130. For example, for the LLP form, some jurisdictions provide only "partial
shield" (sometimes called "narrow shield") protection for the general partners
against tort claims against the LLP for torts with which those partners were not
involved and had no knowledge of, but do not provide any protection against be-
ing held personally liable for the contract obligations of the LLP. Other states, in
contrast, provide "full shield" (sometimes called "broad shield") protection that
not only provides the general partners with similar protection against personal
liability for tort claims, but also shields them from personal liability for the contrac-
tual obligations of the LLP. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 8, at 50-52.
131. See Thomas E. Ruledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You
May Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 205,
226-27 (2006) C [A] crucial qualifier to ... the respect for the limited liability
afforded to a foreign entity by the jurisdiction of organization is the limitation of
the foreign structure to activities that could be carried on by the equivalent domes-
tic structure.... [which is not always permitted by] the various LLC... acts.")
(citing the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and the Kentucky and Texas
statutes).
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such controversies, at least for LLCs,' 32 and perhaps for LLP's and
LLLP's as well. 133 As support for this position, however, those com-
mentators generally do not offer a convincing principled justifica-
tion for departing from general choice-of-law principles in
adjudicating the rights of entity creditors, which as discussed above
would be difficult if not impossible to do. They essentially assert,
without supporting discussion, that Restatement (Second) section 307
mandates the application of the law of the state of incorporation to
corporate veil-piercing controversies' 3 4 and that the decision by the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) to take this position, presumably
so as to promote predictability and uniformity across jurisdictions,
is consistent with court rulings'3 5 and should be regarded as
broadly authoritative and be extended to apply to similar controver-
sies involving non-corporate limited liability entities.13 6
However, the better reading of Restatement (Second) section 307
is that it calls for application of the law of the state of incorporation
to piercing controversies in the corporate context only when this
result is justified by general choice-of-law principles. This conclu-
sion also equally undercuts the use of section 307 as persuasive au-
thority for applying the law of the state of organization to resolve
claims by LLP, LLLP, and LLC creditors that seek to hold certain
partners or members of those entities personally liable for those
claims. The law governing claims of these sorts should also be de-
termined through the use of general choice-of-law principles, and
not in accordance with the internal affairs rule.
132. See, e.g., id. at 238 ("LLC members in a foreign jurisdiction, even a non-
LLC jurisdiction, should enjoy the limited liability afforded by the jurisdiction of
incorporation.").
133. See id. at 238-42.
134. See id. at 230-31.
135. Id. at 216 ("[Clourts apply [the internal affairs rule] to... whether a
foreign jurisdiction should pierce the corporate veil, and questions of shareholder
limited liability. While this application appears contrary to the label 'internal af-
fairs,' it is actually appropriate as it addresses when the owners (shareholders)
should be held liable for a corporate debt that cannot be satisfied out of available
corporate assets.").
136. See id. at 238-42.
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